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Abstract 
   This paper uses panel data from Japan to decompose productivity growth 
measured by the growth of output per labor unit into three components of efficiency 
improvement, capital accumulation and technological progress. It then examines their 
determinants through a dynamic panel model.  In particular, this paper focuses on the 
question of how inequality, trust and humans affect the above components.  The main 
findings derived from empirical estimations are: (1) Inequality impedes not only 
improvements in efficiency but also capital accumulation. (2) A degree of trust promotes 
efficiency improvements and capital accumulation at the same time.  However, human 
capital merely enhances improvements in efficiency.  
 
Keywords:  Heterogeneity, Inequality, Trust, Data envelopment analysis 
JEL classification: E25, O4, O15 
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1. Introduction 
 
  There has recently been increasing interest in the economic consequences of 
factors such as ethnic heterogeneity, social polarization, social trust, social network and 
social capital; factors that have been used to shed light in areas of sociology or political 
science (e.g., Coleman, 1990; Fukuyama, 1995; Granovetter, 1985; Putnam, 2000)3.  
Reflecting this trend, a growing number of researchers have examined how and to what 
extent socio-economic factors are related to economic growth (e.g., Easterly and Levine, 
1997;Knack and Keefer, 1997; Montavo and Reynal-Querol, 2005; Zak and Knack, 
2001)4.   
For example, social polarization is considered to reduce growth through various 
channels. It has been found that ethnic and religious polarization has a large and 
negative effect on economic development through a reduction of investment and an 
increase in governmental consumption (Montalvo and Reynal-Quarol, 2005).  On the 
other hand, from the standpoint of economic polarization, opinions seem to vary as to 
the effects of income inequality, which is usually measured as the Gini coefficient for 
economic growth5.  Some researchers have found inequality has negative effects on 
growth (e.g., Alesina and Perotti, 1996; Keefer and Knack, 2002; Mo, 2000; Perotti, 
                                                   
3 For instance, Spagnolo (1999) addresses the influence of social relations that are 
strengthened by social capital in cooperation with organization such as community.  
Not only interactions between trust and legal enforcement, but also those with social 
capital are examined when financial development is induced (Guiso et al., 2004).  
Alesina and La Ferrara (2000) investigated how heterogeneity affects participating 
behavior considered as collective action.  Lassen (2007) attempts to investigate 
influences of ethnic heterogeneity and trust on the size of the informal sector. 
4 Hall and Jones (1999) investigate how socio-economic factors are related to output per 
worker. 
5 In general, a country‟s level of economic inequality has been viewed as an outcome of 
its economic performance, such as by economic growth.  In recent years, there has been 
increasing interest in the opposite causality; that is to say, the question of how 
inequality affects economic growth. 
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1996; Persson and Tabellini, 1994; Sukiassyan, 2007).  By contrast, positive effects 
have also been observed (e.g., Forbes, 2000; Li and Zou, 1998) 6.  There are also 
inconclusive results (e.g., Banerjee and Duflo,2003).   
If socio-economic factors are profoundly associated with economic growth, it 
would be cogent to ask what are the channels through which socio-economic factors 
have an effect on growth.   The classical analysis of Kaldor (1956) argued that income 
distribution has a critical effect upon capital accumulation, through which economic 
growth is affected. Recent studies show that low trust and heterogeneous societies 
reduce the rate of investment and therefore hamper capital accumulation, resulting in a 
decreasing growth rate (Zak and Knack, 2000; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005).  
Besides capital accumulation, as argued by Shcumpeter (1912), technological progress 
resulting from innovation generated by entrepreneurs involves diffusion of technology, 
leading to economic growth.   Accordingly, economic growth can be attributed to 
several channels such as improvements in efficiency, technological progress, and capital 
accumulation (Kumar and Russell, 2002).  The main purpose of this paper is to 
examine the determinants of efficiency improvement, capital accumulation and 
technological progress. 
  Previous reports (Yamamura and Shin 2007a, 2007b, 2008; Zheng et al., 1998, 
2003) have used data envelopment analysis to construct a production frontier and 
decompose labor-productivity growth into three components of efficiency improvement, 
capital accumulation, and technological progress to more closely investigate economic 
growth.  Through regression analysis such reports have examined how various key 
                                                   
6 One of the explanations for such discordance is that a negative relationship is found 
for less developed countries and by contrast, a positive one is found for developed 
countries (Barro, 2000). 
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independent variables have an effect on these components.  Applying the above 
approach, we attempt to decompose the effects of socio economic factors upon growth 
after controlling for unobservable fixed effects and endogeneity. 
 It is widely and generally acknowledged that post-war Japan has experienced 
the unprecedented economic growth.  Some researchers point out that this economic 
growth is in part because of socio-economic features formed through long-term local 
interaction within organizations such as the community (Hayami, 2001).  What is more, 
the industrial development of Japan was accelerated in part thanks to efficiency 
improvements in post-war Japan (Yamamura and Shin, 2008; Yamamura et al., 2005).   
We thus found it appropriate to deal with the labor-productivity growth of Japan to 
examine how socio-economic factors affect growth through efficiency improvement.  
Accordingly this paper is concerned with Japan‟s labor-productivity growth.  The main 
findings here provide evidence as follows: Inequality impedes not only efficiency 
improvement but also capital accumulation. The degree of trust promotes both 
efficiency improvement and capital accumulation.  However, human capital just 
enhances efficiency improvement.  
  The organization of this paper is as follows:  Section 2 explains briefly the strategy of 
the method used in the present paper and describes data sources.  Subsequently, 
regression functions are presented.  Section 3 discusses the results of the estimations.  
The final section offers concluding observations. An explanation of data envelopment 
analysis and decomposition is in the appendix. 
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2. Methodology 
 
2.1. Data 
 
  Table 1 includes the independent variable definitions, means, and the coefficient 
of variation of the analyzed data.  Details of each variable are as follows.  The Gini 
coefficient of income is represented as GINI, in 1979, 1984, 1989, 1994 and 1999 as 
collected from the Statistics Bureau of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications (various years).  Surveys were carried out in 1979 and 1996 by the 
Japan Broadcasting Corporation (Nihon Hoso Kyokai); respondents were asked, “Are 
there many persons whom you can trust in your neighborhood?”   We use data from 
the Japan Broadcasting Corporation (1979, 1996) in which the rate of respondents who 
said “yes” was separately reported for males and females at the prefecture level.  This 
rate is used as the indicator of trust.  The proxy of human capital represented as HC is 
obtained from Hi-stat7.  Apart from GINI, TRUST, and HC, all data were collected 
from the Index Corporation (2006). 
Data related to these variables are unavailable for some years.  As set out above, 
data of the Gini coefficient and the indicator of trust are insufficient to construct as 
panel data.  Therefore additional data were generated by interpolation based on the 
assumption of constant changes in rates to make up for this deficiency8.   
                                                   
7 Data of human capital is available from the Hi-stat HP: 
http://21coe.ier.hit-u.ac.jp/research/database.   
See http://www.ier.hit-u.ac.jp/~fukao/japanese/data/fuken2000/datamaking.pdf for a full 
account of the method of calculation. 
8 It must be noted that these data might suffer from measurement errors when 
interpolation is conducted. Caution should thus be exercised when interpreting the 
estimation results. 
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2.2.  Methods 
 
We analyze the extent of efficiency improvement, capital accumulation and 
technological progress by data envelopment analysis (abbreviated hereafter as DEA) 
using prefecture level panel data from 1979 to 1997. First, we estimate the 
labor-productivity in each prefecture by DEA (Banker et al., 1984).  Labor-productivity 
growth can be decomposed into efficiency improvement, capital accumulation and 
technological progress.  This approach has an advantage over the growth accounting 
approach in that we can further decompose total factor productivity growth, thereby 
obtaining more detailed information.  Second, we take these variables as dependent 
variables and estimate their determinants by controlling unobservable individual and 
time effects through dynamic panel model9.  This method allows us to investigate how 
and to what extent inequality and additional key factors have an effect upon 
productivity growth through efficiency improvement and capital accumulation.  We 
can examine whether and to what degree various factors determining productivity 
growth affect efficiency improvement and capital accumulation. See appendix for details 
about DEA. 
 
2.3. Specification of the Regression Function   
  
   We would now like to formulate a regression function which takes 
                                                   
9 Some prior research has used panel data to employ a fixed effects model (Banerjee 
and Duflo, 1996; Forbes, 2000; Li and Zou, 1998) and a dynamic panel model (Banerjee 
and Duflo, 1996; Forbes, 2000; Skiassyan, 2007). 
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labor-productivity, the level of efficiency, the level of per capita capital, and the level of 
technology as dependent variables denoted as LYit, respectively.  To estimate their 
determinants, the following equation is postulated: 
 
LYit =  1 LYit0 + 2LGINIit0 + 3 GHETit0 + 4 LTRUSit0 + 5LHCit0 + 6 LDYit0 + 
7 LRAIN it0  + 8 LSNOW it0  + it   +uit ,  
 
εt , iti u,  represent the following unobservable effects; t„s year-specific effects, the i 
„s prefecture-specific effects, and the error term, respectively.  t0 is the lagged year of 
the t„s year. i  includes the time-invariant feature. The structure of the data set used 
in this study is a panel.  We incorporate a lagged dependent variable, LYit0, to control 
for the initial level.  We employed a dynamic panel model to reduce the omitted 
variable bias caused by time invariant individual specific features (Banerjee and Duflo, 
2003; Forbes, 2000; Li and Zou, 1998).  Development stages are considered to be 
covered in εt, and each year‟s dummy variables are included to restrain the time-specific 
effects (Forbes, 2000; Li and Zou, 1998).  The stage of development seems to be 
correlated with growth and inequality at the same time, causing the spurious 
correlation problem.  Inclusion of year dummies is thought to alleviate this problem.  
In addition to year dummies, human capital that is accounted for later appears to 
control for possible sources of spurious correlation since it stands for the stage of 
development10.  What is more, to address potential endogenous problems with lagged 
                                                   
10 Previous researches include variables used in this research and additionally control 
for various factors concerning institutional and economic conditions (e.g., Barro, 2000; 
Banerjee and Duflo, 2003; Forbes, 2000; Hall and Jones, 1999; Keefer and Knack, 2002; 
Knack, 2003; Knack and Keefer, 1997; Perotti, 1996; Persson and Tabellini, 1994; Zak 
and Knack, 2001).    
 Institutional and geographical features can be controlled by the fixed effects 
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independent variables, We carry out dynamic panel estimation as developed by 
Arellano-bond (Baltagi, 2005) since dynamic panel models allow past realizations of the 
dependent variable to affect its current level.     
Additional key independent variables, regarded as socio-economic ones, are 
explained in the sections that follow 11 .  Combined expectations about efficiency 
improvement, capital accumulation, and technological progress lead us to predictions 
about productivity growth since, as explained in the subsection 2.2, efficiency 
improvement, capital accumulation, and technological progress can be obtained from 
the decomposition of productivity growth. 
 
2.4. Gini coefficient and generational heterogeneity  
 
LGINI represents the Gini coefficient of per capita income in logform, LGINI is 
incorporated into the function to capture income inequality effects in the base year t0. 
In conjecture based upon political economy arguments, redistribution of resources from 
the rich to the poor is more apt to be called for if income is unequally distributed.  In 
this case, income inequality is the cause of a reduction in economic growth since the 
incentive for workers to work harder and for entrepreneurs to generate innovation is 
reduced.  Consequently, there is a decline in the impetus to obtain more advanced 
technology than that presently existing, leading to a retardation of efficiency 
improvement.  As well, technology would not be progressed very much if there is a 
                                                                                                                                                     
estimation.  Also, there is little difference among institutions of the prefectures of 
Japan. This is why that we use only the important variables that are frequently used in 
the literature.     
11 Besides of socio-economic independent variables, indicators of a natural environment 
such as day hours, annual precipitation, and quantity of snowfall are added as a control 
variable. 
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scarcity of innovation.  Another point to be borne in mind is that if there imperfect 
conditions related to the credit market, investors will have limited access to credit 
leading to reduced investment and thus capital accumulation will be hampered12.  
Thus, the signs of LGINI are predicted to be negative in each of the estimations. 
     The function includes the log of the index of generational fractionalization 
represented as LGHET with the aim of capturing the effects of the generational 
heterogeneity13.  Recently researchers have draw attention to the structure of society 
from the view point of heterogeneity.  It is increasing acknowledged that people are 
unwilling to contribute to public goods benefiting other ethnic groups.  Findings 
reported, for instance, show that ethnic heterogeneity reduces the incentive for 
collective action (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000) so decreasing voluntary tax compliance 
(Lassen, 2007) and reducing investment, thus hampering economic growth (Easterly 
and Levine, 1997; Montavo and Reynal-Querol, 2005).  From the above an inference 
that capital accumulation is not promoted, because of social heterogeneity impeding 
collective action calling for the provision of public goods, can be derived.  On the other 
hand, intuitively worker homogeneity is required for the smooth transmission of 
knowledge by economizing transaction costs.  Social heterogeneity thus hampers 
knowledge spillover resulting in deteriorating efficiency.  Nevertheless, little 
speculation has, with the exception of Vigdor (2004), taken place concerning the effects 
                                                   
12 Besides the discussion as above, polarization such as inequality is thought to reduce 
the security of property and contractual rights, and through this channel polarization is 
inversely associated with economic growth. 
13 Following the general index of fragmentation (Alesina and La Ferra, 2002; Alesina et 
al., 2003), fragmentation can be written as 
 


I
i
i
N
n
FRA
1
2)(1 , 
where in is the number of people in the i th group,N is the population, and I is the 
number of groups in the prefecture.  
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of generational heterogeneity on economic growth or collective action.  On the 
assumption that generational and ethnic heterogeneity have the same influence upon 
economic growth, it would be expected that generational heterogeneity impedes 
efficiency improvement and capital accumulation.   This leads us to expect LGHET to 
take the negative sign in the estimation of capital accumulation, efficiency improvement 
and therefore productivity growth. 
 
 2.5. Trust   
     LTRUS stands for the log of the indicator of trust explained earlier.  Social trust, 
which is one of the elements of social capital, is thought to facilitate coordination and 
cooperation (Putnam, 2000).  That is to say, as presented in Knack and Keefer (1997), a 
high degree of mutual trust among people is a cause economizing transaction costs.  
This feature of trust enables technology to diffuse more smoothly and effectively, 
resulting in efficiency improvement.    
 With respect to the association of trust and capital accumulation, Zak and Knack 
(2002) present an economic model said to underlie the positive effect of trust upon 
investment and present evidence coinciding with the model.  In this model, assuming 
that a principal-agent relationship holds between investors regarded as principals and 
brokers as agents, the principal is subject to moral hazard by the agent.  They show, in 
this setting, that the amount of investment is higher when trust is higher and therefore 
cheating by a broker is less likely to take place.  Considering this discussion of trust, 
leads us to a prediction that the signs of LTRUS become positive in estimations of 
efficiency improvement, capital accumulation and thereby productivity growth. 
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2.6. Human capital   
HC is the indicator of human capital.  It is generally and widely acknowledged 
that human capital makes a contribution to economic growth.  For this, higher 
education is likely to promote economic growth through various easily understandable 
channels.  For instance, more educated people make better use of expertise in 
generating new technology leading to technological progress. They also can get an 
advantage over less educated ones by learning from others so that information spillover 
becomes more facile and effectively.  As a result, efficiency is improved.  Nevertheless, 
the relationship between capital accumulation and HC seems to be equivocal.  Taking 
the above considerations together, HC is expected to take a positive sign for efficiency 
improvement and technological progress.  
 
3. Estimation results 
    
     The estimation results of the dynamic panel model with a year dummy for 
productivity growth, efficiency improvement, capital accumulation, and technological 
progress are reported in Tables 2, 3, 4 and 5, respectively.  Economic inequality is 
associated with the extent of economic development (Barro, 2000) and therefore seems 
to be under the influence of economic growth.  If this is the case, the coefficients of 
GINI would suffer from an endogeneity bias.  Therefore, in columns (2), (4), (6), and (8) 
in each of the tables, GINI is treated as endogenous explanatory variables, and we use 
the levels for two periods or more as additional instruments (Arellano, 2003).  In 
addition, results when second-order lags of an independent variable is included are 
reported in columns (3), (4), (7), and (8) in each table. Other socio-economic factors 
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captured by the independent variables, LGHET, LTRUS and LHC, are treated as 
exogenous variables in this paper. Peoples‟ birth year was decided before the current 
period, leading to generation heterogeneity, LGHET, being given. The decision to invest 
in human capital was also determined before the current period and so the level of 
human capital, LHC, is considered the predetermined exogenous variable. The 
magnitude of trust, LTRUS, is thought to be based on a non-economic background such 
as culture or history. A non-economic background can be regarded as an unobservable 
fixed feature and therefore is controlled for by dynamic panel estimations. That is, 
dynamic panel estimation allows correlations to be made between unobservable fixed 
features (non-economic background) and LTRUS. Estimation results do not suffer from 
endogenous bias even if the non-economic background is correlated with LTRUS14.  
Sargan‟s over-identification test and second-order serial correlation test are 
available to check the validity of the estimation results in the dynamic panel model.  
Above all, a test for the hypothesis that there is no second-order serial correlation for 
the disturbance of the first-differenced equation is important because the consistency of 
the estimator relies upon no second-order serial correlation. 
    Before discussing the results, it is worth noting that because all variables 
incorporated in the estimation function are in log form, the coefficients can be 
interpreted as elasticities. 
 
                
3.1. Productivity growth 
                                                   
14 Despite these reasons, there seems the possibility that LGHET, LTRUS and LHC 
cause endogenous biases. It is, however, beyond the scope of this paper to consider the 
possibility. 
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       We begin by discussing Table 2 that shows results concerning the determinants 
of labor-productivity growth. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992), uses Japanese prefecture 
level data to investigate convergence of incomes using Barro regression. They found 
that the Japanese economy supports β -convergence of neoclassical theory.  In 
contrast to their results, however, the initial level of output, LY_1, yields positive signs 
at the 1 % level in all estimations. This does not support the convergence hypothesis15. 
This paper controls for unobservable time invariant specific features using a dynamic 
panel model. In addition, year specific macro shocks are captured by year dummies. 
Most previous works have not controlled for these factors and so suffer from estimation 
bias. That is, an omitted variable bias is thought to account for the inconsistencies. That 
income inequality and generational heterogeneity have a negative influence upon 
productivity growth is expressed clearly in the third and forth rows since all signs of the 
coefficients of LGINI and LGHET are negative and significant at the 1 % level.  It is 
worth noting that the magnitude of LGHET is greater than 4, being far larger than 
those of other variables; suggesting that productivity growth decreases by more than 
4 % if generational heterogeneity rises by 1 %.  From this, we derive the argument that 
generational structure plays a more significant role in productivity growth than does 
income distribution.   
The fact that the signs of LTRUS are positive despite being statistically 
                                                   
15 Barro regression has been widely applied in analyses of the convergence hypothesis. 
But Quah (1993) criticizes approaches using Barro regression and proposes an analysis 
using a Markov transition matrix, as an alternative way to test the convergence 
hypothesis. Kawagoe (1999) uses data for per capita gross prefectural production and 
adopts this method. He concludes that there is no regional income convergence 
hypothesis in Japan. Fujita and Tabuchi (1997) also shows that there is no regional 
income convergence hypothesis in Japan using Theil's measure.    
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insignificant in some specifications coincided with the anticipation that trust is 
positively related to productivity growth.   We found it evident that human capital 
represented as LHC made a tremendous contribution to productivity growth because 
LHC takes the expected positive and significant signs, and its magnitude is far larger 
than LTRUS.     
     Even though only columns (4) and (8) pass both Sargan‟s test and the second-order 
correlation test, they do not affect the validity of the estimation results since the results 
are not affected by specifications. 
 
3.2. Efficiency improvement 
 
      We now discuss the results of Table 3.  The significant negative signs of the 
coefficients on LGNI, which persist under different specifications, indicate that 
economic inequality hampers efficiency improvement, as expected earlier.  
Corresponding with that anticipation, LGHET produces negative signs in all 
estimations even though no statistical significance is found.  The results shown above 
tell us that socio-economic polarization and fractionalization such as economic 
inequality and generational heterogeneity cause efficiency improvement to decline.  It 
is noteworthy that LGHET is far larger in magnitude than LGNI, which coincides with 
the results shown in Table 2.    The combined results of LGNI and LGHET appear in 
Tables 2 and 3 lead us to argue that economic inequality and generational heterogeneity 
have a detrimental effect upon productivity growth, partly though their negative impact 
upon efficiency.   
  We see from the fifth row that LTRUS yields a positive sign and is statistically 
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significant at the 1 % level in all specifications.  This reflects that trust is positively 
associated with efficiency improvement and therefore endorses the expectation.  That 
is to say, learning from others is an easily facilitated route resulting in efficiency 
improvement because of the lower transaction cost where people have a tendency to 
trust each other.  The coefficients on LHC take the anticipated positive signs and are 
statistically significant at the 1 % level, which persists in all estimations.  The 
magnitude of LHC is from 3 to 7 times larger than that of LTRUS.   This implies that 
the individual ability captured by human capital makes a greater contribution to 
facilitating learning from others and then improves the efficiency than does the 
closeness of interpersonal relationships captured by trust.    In addition, as is later 
discussed in the following subsections, human capital hardly affects capital 
accumulation and technological progress.  We found it interesting that the 
predominant positive effect of human capital on productivity growth is not from its 
effect on capital accumulation and technological progress, but from its effect on 
efficiency improvement.  During the high growth post-war period, Japan was thought 
to be an example of a newly industrializing economy on track to catch up with the 
advanced economies by borrowing technology (Hayami, 2001).  According to the 
evidence provided above, this catch-up mechanism seemed to persist even long after 
Japan became a developed country in that less developed prefectures learnt from 
developed ones, thereby improving efficiency.  What is more, a high degree of human 
capital has promoted this catch up mechanism among prefectures during Japan‟s 
modern period. 
 
3.3. Capital accumulation 
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     Looking at the results presented in Table 5 reveals that income inequality reduces 
capital accumulation, which is consistent with the expectation since the coefficients on 
LGINI are consistently negative.  In contrast to this, generational heterogeneity 
produces positive signs, despite being statistically insignificant, which does not 
correspondent to the prediction.  One plausible explanation is as follows.  The larger 
the size of a generation, the larger the number of rivals within it.  People are more 
likely to become rivals in various situations if they belong to the same generation, 
resulting in a hampering of collective action.  Therefore, generational heterogeneity is 
less likely to impede collective action (Yamamura, 2008) and so capital accumulation 
does not decline.  
  The significantly positive signs of LTRUS in most of the estimations tells us that 
higher trust is apt to stimulate investment and therefore increase capital.  The 
expectation about the effects of trust on capital accumulation is borne out in the results 
of the estimations, which coincide with the findings of Zak and Knack (2001).    
  LHC yields negative signs despite statistical insignificance in all estimations. 
Taking the results of the efficiency improvement estimations together, this can be 
interpreted as that higher human capital allocates more resources to enhance 
technological catch-up instead of capital accumulation, presumably because returns 
from physical capital are lower than those from technological catch-up in a developed 
country such as Japan.  This presumption seems to be in line with the evidence 
provided by Yamamura and Shin (2008) that technological catch-up is three times as 
effective as capital accumulation, but that both have worked to cause economic 
convergence among Japanese prefectures.     
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  Overall, the estimation results as discussed above are valid not only because they 
are robust to the choice of specifications, but also because they pass the second order 
correlation test in columns (3), (4), (7), and (8), even though no estimation results pass 
Sargan‟s tests.   
 
3.4. Technological progress 
Table 5 shows the results of technology improvement.  The signs of LGINI and 
LGHET are not stable and are statistically insignificant.   Contrary to the expectation, 
the coefficients of LH produce negative signs.  Furthermore, none of the results of the 
estimations pass Sargan‟s and second-serial correlation tests.  Taking this together, the 
factors included in the function hardly affect technology progress.  Therefore, those 
factors have effects on the labor-productivity growth not through technological progress 
but through efficiency improvement and capital accumulation. 
We have so far examined the determinants of productivity growth, efficiency 
improvement, capital accumulation and technological progress.  The combined results 
presented above make the following evident.  Inequality impedes not only efficiency 
improvement but also capital accumulation.  The degree of trust simultaneously 
promotes efficiency improvement and capital accumulation.  On the other hand, 
results that do not coincide with the anticipation raised earlier and the estimations 
results do not pass any tests that check their validity when technology progress is 
examined. This is why findings are not presented regarding technological progress.  
Overall, the results of productivity growth and efficiency improvement, to a large extent, 
share similarities regarding the effects of income inequality, trust, and human capital.  
It follows from this that productivity growth is in the large part attributable to 
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efficiency improvement although capital accumulation has some important effects upon 
productivity growth.   
 
4. Conclusion 
   
 In response to an upsurge in interest in ethnic heterogeneity, social capital, and 
general trust from a interdisciplinary point of view, increasing research has recently 
been devoted to accounting for how socio-economic factors affect economic growth. It 
thus seems to be open to question whether the influences of socio-economic factors on 
capital accumulation and diffusion of technology are different.  There have been, 
however, few attempts to examine the channels through which socio-economic factors 
have an effect upon productivity growth.  Accordingly, this paper, rather than putting 
an emphasis on just productivity growth, decomposes it into some components and then 
carefully investigates them.  To this end, using panel data from Japan, which is 
characterized by a homogenous society, this paper employs the DEA method and a 
dynamic panel model.   
 Key findings derived from empirical estimations that are invariant to alternative 
specifications are as follows. 
 (1) Inequality impedes not only efficiency improvement but also capital 
accumulation.  Furthermore, the magnitude of the elasticity of efficiency improvement 
with respect to inequality, which is -0.06, is about three times larger than that of capital 
accumulation.  
(2) The degree of trust promotes efficiency improvement and capital 
accumulation at the same time.  On the other hand, human capital only enhances 
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efficiency improvement. The elasticity of efficiency improvement with respect to human 
capital is about 0.64, which is eight times larger than that with respect to trust. This 
means that human capital has a larger impact on technological catch-up, although both 
trust and human capital make contributions. 
    Based upon the findings indicated above, it can be plausibly pointed out that the 
effect of trust on productivity growth through diffusion of technology is larger than 
through the increase in investment, although both diffusion of technology and capital 
accumulation are attributable to a high degree of trust.   Furthermore, the impact of 
human capital on productivity growth arises not from enhancing investment and 
technological progress but from promoting diffusion of technology.  Contrarily, 
economic polarization such as inequality hampers investment and diffusion of 
technology.  
It seems appropriate that socio-economic factors such as generation heterogeneity, 
human capital, and trust cause endogenous biases. However, this paper does not 
consider this problem. It should be noted that the present paper is limited to an 
empirical analysis of Japan in which institutional conditions such as the legal system do 
not vary and therefore cannot be considered as institutional factors.  These are the 
major issues remaining to be addressed in our future study. 
 
Appendix: Data Envelopment Analysis and Tripartite Decomposition 
DEA is a nonparametric method to construct a production frontier and associated 
productive efficiency indexes for a whole data set.  The approach for obtaining the 
production function is to envelop all scattered data on the dimension of input and 
output factors in a convex cone. Then, the upper boundary of this set represents the 
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production frontier as the best practice. This method has advantages over other 
methods as it requires no specification of functional forms, except that it needs to 
assume returns to scale of technology. In this case, we assume constant-returns-to-scale 
(CRS) technology with three variables: capital stock  K  and labor  L  as aggregate 
inputs and output  Y  as the aggregate output. We can now express the production 
function in two dimensions by modifying a linear homogeneous production process 
where output per labor  LYy   can be produced by capital per labor  LKk  . 
Then  itit yk , , t =1,…,T , i =1,…, I , represents observations on these two variables of 
i  prefecture for time t .  
The concept of the DEA method is briefly described in Figure A1 without a specific 
mathematical explanation.  In this yk,  space of scalar input and output, there are 
12 scattered points of  itit yk ,  that represent observations in a given period for a 
certain hypothetical economy. The best-practice production frontier under CRS 
technology can be constituted by enveloping the upper boundary of these observations 
corresponding with each level of inputs (4 points in this case) including the origin to 
make a convex cone.  Therefore, it represents the maximum feasible outputs given 
each level of input.  Let  tt ky  denote the maximum output that we can produce with 
capital stock tk  in period t .  
We utilize the output-based efficiency index to measure the distance between the 
observed output level and the level on the frontier for a given input level.  Such an 
index for i  prefectures at time t  is defined by  
    titititit Sykyke   ,|min,                     (A1) 
where tS  indicates the CRS production set.  For example, the output-based efficiency 
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level of one observation  tt yke ,  at point A in Figure A1 is the ratio of the actual 
output ty  to the production frontier level  tt ky , that is,    ttttt kyyyke , =a/b.  
Output-based efficiency is always less than or equal to 1, which indicates the relative 
efficiency for the best practice of observations at a given period.  It has the advantage 
of measuring productivity shortfall and catch-up relative to the best-practice frontier.  
 
Figure A1. Data Envelopment Analysis Method 
 
We now explain the tripartite decomposition method.  If each of the production 
frontiers is constructed for any two years, we can then decompose productivity growth 
between two periods into three components. The tripartite decomposition method is 
conceptually described between two period technologies in Figure A2.  We consider the 
two periods as the base period t  and in the current period 1t . ty  and tk  
represent output and capital stock per capita, respectively, in period t .  Thus, the ratio 
of actual outputs between two years can be arranged as, 
 
 
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ttt
t
t
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  1111 .                         (A2) 
There are two ways to modify this ratio. One way is to multiply the top and bottom by 
 1tt ky , the potential output at current capital stock under the base year technology, in 
the equation (A3).  The other way is to multiply by  tt ky 1 , the potential output at 
base capital stock under the current year technology, in the equation (A4).   
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To adjust the differences of (A3) and (A4), we take the geometric average of both 
decompositions as follows.
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    (A5) 
where   stands for the contribution of the efficiency changes,   is the contribution 
of the technological changes and   is the contribution of the capital accumulation 
between two periods.  Output changes for the two periods can be decomposed by 
efficiency, technological and capital accumulation changes.  An efficiency change is the 
change in the distance from the frontier.  The technological change is the shift in the 
frontier.  The capital accumulation change is the movement along the frontier.   
 
Figure A2. Illustration of Tripartite Decomposition 
 
We diagrammatically explain decomposition identity (A5) in Figure A2.  Points 
B and G represent feasible input-output combinations in period t  and 1t , 
respectively.  Multiplying the top and bottom by  1tt ky  or  tt ky 1 , we obtain 
AC
EF
EF
EH
AB/AC
EG/EH
AB
EG
                      (A6) 
or  
AD
EH
AC
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AB/AC
EG/EH
AB
EG
 ,                    (A7) 
respectively.  The geometric average of (A4) and (A5) is 
2
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Let 
AB/AC
EG/EH
E , 
2
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, then (A8) is equal to (A5). 
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics 
Variables Definition Mean Coefficient 
of variation 
LY 
 
Output per worker in log form 1.183 0.552 
LE Level of efficiency in log form 
 
-0.241 -0.560 
LK Level of capital in log form 
 
1.285 0.789 
LT Level of technology in log form 
 
1.424 0.450 
LGINI 
 
Gini coefficients in log form -1.275 -0.044 
LGHET 
 
Generation heterogeneity in log form -0.067 -0.052 
LTRUS 
 
Magnitude of trust in log form -0.752 -0.129 
LHC 
 
Human capital index in log form -0.002 -22.423 
LDAY Day hours in log form 
 
7.585 0.016 
LRAIN Annual precipitation in log form 
 
7.315 0.045 
LSNOW Quantity of snowfall in log form 3.083 0.328 
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Table 2 
Determinants of productivity growth (Dynamic Panel Model) 
 (1)L Y 
    
(2)L Y 
    
(3) LY 
    
(4) LY 
    
(5) LY 
    
(6) LY 
    
(7) LY 
    
(8) LY 
    
LY_1 0.71** 
(26.1) 
0.71** 
(26.8) 
0.74** 
(19.3) 
0.71** 
(26.8) 
0.72** 
(27.27) 
0.73** 
(28.1) 
0.75** 
(19.6) 
0.75** 
(19.9) 
LY_2   -0.04 
(-1.10) 
-0.03 
(-0.96) 
  -0.03 
(-0.94) 
-0.02 
(-0.78) 
LGINI -0.09** 
(-3.00) 
-0.07** 
(-2.67) 
-0.08** 
(-2.92) 
-0.07** 
(-2.67) 
-0.08** 
(-2.90) 
-0.07** 
(-2.52) 
-0.08** 
(-2.83) 
-0.07** 
(-2.46) 
LGHET -4.13* 
(-2.27) 
-4.55** 
(-2.52) 
-4.28* 
(-2.32) 
-4.55** 
(-2.52) 
    
LTRUS 0.05* 
(1.94) 
0.03 
(1.47) 
0.05* 
(1.96) 
0.03 
(1.47) 
0.11* 
(1.89) 
0.08 
(1.44) 
0.11* 
(1.90) 
0.08 
(1.45) 
LHC 0.64** 
(3.39) 
0.56** 
(3.05) 
0.65** 
(3.40) 
0.56** 
(3.05) 
0.76** 
(4.18) 
0.69** 
(3.91) 
0.77** 
(4.19) 
0.70** 
(3.92) 
LDAY -0.04** 
(-2.55) 
-0.05** 
(-3.33) 
-0.04** 
(-2.43) 
-0.05** 
(-3.33) 
-0.04** 
(-2.49) 
-0.05** 
(-3.27) 
-0.04** 
(-2.39) 
-0.05** 
(-3.17) 
LRAIN 0.002 
(0.54) 
0.002 
(0.56) 
0.002 
(0.56) 
0.002 
(0.56) 
0.001 
(0.40) 
0.001 
(0.40) 
0.002 
(0.42) 
0.002 
(0.42) 
LSNOW -0.001 
(-0.73) 
-0.001 
(-0.67) 
-0.001 
(-0.62) 
-0.001 
(-0.67) 
-0.002 
(-1.02) 
-0.002 
(-1.01) 
-0.002 
(-0.93) 
-0.002 
(-0.93) 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sargan-test (P-value) 
 
0.00 0.11 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.21 
Serial correlation 
 First order (P-value) 
 Second order (P-value) 
 
0.00 
0.07 
 
0.00 
0.09 
 
0.00 
0.14 
 
0.00 
0.15 
 
0.00 
0.08 
 
0.00 
0.10 
 
0.00 
0.14 
 
0.00 
0.14 
Sample 
Groups 
719 
46 
719 
46 
719 
46 
719 
46 
719 
46 
719 
46 
719 
46 
719 
46 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. * and ** indicate significance at 5 and 1 per cent levels, respectively (one-sided tests).  
In each of the estimates, year dummies are included but not reported to save space. 
 
 
 31 
Table 3 
Determinants of efficiency improvement (Dynamic Panel Model) 
 (1)L E 
    
(2)L E 
    
(3) LE 
    
(4) LE 
    
(5) LE 
    
(6) LE 
    
(7) LE 
    
(8) LE 
    
LE_1 0.80** 
(34.4) 
0.80** 
(35.4) 
0.85** 
(22.6) 
0.85** 
(22.9) 
0.80** 
(34.4) 
0.80** 
(35.4) 
0.85** 
(22.6) 
0.85** 
(23.2) 
LE_2   -0.06* 
(-1.66) 
-0.06* 
(-1.86) 
  -0.06* 
(-1.68) 
-0.06* 
(-1.89) 
LGINI -0.06* 
(-2.01) 
-0.06* 
(-1.96) 
-0.05* 
(-1.76) 
-0.05* 
(-1.71) 
-0.06* 
(-2.04) 
-0.06* 
(-2.00) 
-0.05* 
(-1.79) 
-0.05* 
(-1.74) 
LGHET -0.87 
(-0.48) 
-1.46 
(-0.81) 
-0.77 
(-0.42) 
-1.34 
(-0.73) 
    
LTRUS 0.07** 
(2.57) 
0.08** 
(2.76) 
0.08** 
(2.68) 
0.08** 
(2.85) 
0.16** 
(2.42) 
0.16** 
(2.58) 
0.17** 
(2.54) 
0.18** 
(2.69) 
LHC 0.52** 
(2.46) 
0.60** 
(3.01) 
0.56** 
(2.57) 
0.64** 
(3.09) 
0.53** 
(2.69) 
0.64** 
(3.39) 
0.57** 
(2.79) 
0.67** 
(3.45) 
LDAY -0.01 
(-1.04) 
-0.02* 
(-1.67) 
-0.01 
(-0.87) 
-0.02 
(-1.43) 
-0.01 
(-1.04) 
-0.02* 
(-1.70) 
-0.01 
(-0.86) 
-0.02 
(-1.45) 
LRAIN 0.005 
(1.04) 
0.004 
(0.82) 
0.005 
(1.07) 
0.004 
(0.86) 
0.005 
(1.02) 
0.003 
(0.77) 
0.005 
(1.06) 
0.004 
(0.82) 
LSNOW -0.003 
(-1.16) 
-0.002 
(-1.02) 
-0.002 
(-1.06) 
-0.002 
(-0.93) 
-0.003 
(-1.22) 
-0.002 
(-1.12) 
-0.002 
(-1.11) 
-0.002 
(-1.01) 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sargan-test (P-value) 
 
0.00 0.11 0.01 0.40 0.00 0.10 0.01 0.39 
Serial correlation 
 First order (P-value) 
 Second order (P-value) 
 
0.00 
0.07 
 
0.00 
0.08 
 
0.00 
0.21 
 
0.00 
0.26 
 
0.00 
0.08 
 
0.00 
0.09 
 
0.00 
0.22 
 
0.00 
0.27 
Sample 
Groups 
719 
46 
719 
46 
719 
46 
719 
46 
719 
46 
719 
46 
719 
46 
719 
46 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. * and ** indicate significance at 5 and 1 per cent levels, respectively (one-sided tests).  
In each of the estimates, year dummies are included but not reported to save space. 
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Table 4 
Determinants of capital deepening (Dynamic Panel Model) 
 (1)L K 
    
(2)L K 
    
(3) LK 
    
(4) LK 
    
(5) LK 
    
(6) LK 
    
(7) LK 
    
(8) LK 
    
LK_1 0.93** 
(90.1) 
0.93** 
(91.3) 
1.12** 
(26.4) 
1.11** 
(26.9) 
0.93** 
(96.5) 
0.93** 
(97.6) 
1.12** 
(26.4) 
1.11** 
(26.9) 
LK_2   -0.18** 
(-4.63) 
-0.18** 
(-4.63) 
  -0.18** 
(-4.64) 
-0.18** 
(-4.65) 
LGINI -0.02* 
(-1.88) 
-0.02* 
(-1.66) 
-0.02* 
(-1.66) 
-0.02 
(-1.44) 
-0.02* 
(-1.82) 
-0.02 
(-1.62) 
-0.02 
(-1.61) 
-0.02 
(-1.39) 
LGHET 0.41 
(0.43) 
0.61 
(0.81) 
0.10 
(0.10) 
0.27 
(0.27) 
    
LTRUS 0.03** 
(2.35) 
0.02* 
(1.96) 
0.02* 
(1.78) 
0.02 
(1.49) 
0.07** 
(2.52) 
0.06* 
(2.12) 
0.06* 
(1.90) 
0.04 
(1.60) 
LHC -0.09 
(-1.02) 
-0.07 
(-0.92) 
-0.08 
(-0.84) 
-0.06 
(-0.74) 
-0.10 
(-1.29) 
-0.09 
(-1.24) 
-0.08 
(-0.97) 
-0.07 
(-0.90) 
LDAY 0.001 
(0.11) 
0.0002 
(0.00) 
-0.004 
(-0.47) 
-0.005 
(-0.59) 
0.001 
(0.12) 
-0.0001 
(-0.01) 
-0.004 
(-0.46) 
-0.005 
(-0.60) 
LRAIN 0.001 
(0.50) 
0.001 
(0.62) 
0.001 
(0.63) 
0.001 
(0.72) 
0.001 
(0.53) 
0.001 
(0.65) 
0.001 
(0.64) 
0.001 
(0.74) 
LSNOW -0.001 
(-1.11) 
-0.001 
(-1.28) 
-0.001 
(-0.65) 
-0.001 
(-0.81) 
-0.001 
(-1.09) 
-0.001 
(-1.23) 
-0.001 
(-0.65) 
-0.001 
(-0.80) 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sargan-test (P-value) 
 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
Serial correlation 
 First order (P-value) 
 Second order (P-value) 
 
0.00 
0.14 
 
0.00 
0.15 
 
0.00 
0.95 
 
0.00 
0.96 
 
0.00 
0.15 
 
0.00 
0.15 
 
0.00 
0.95 
 
0.00 
0.96 
Sample 
Groups 
719 
46 
719 
46 
719 
46 
719 
46 
719 
46 
719 
46 
719 
46 
719 
46 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. * and ** indicate significance at 5 and 1 per cent levels, respectively (one-sided tests).  
In each of the estimates, year dummies are include, but not reported to save space. 
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Table 5 
Determinants of technological progress (Dynamic Panel Model) 
 (1)L T 
    
(2)L T 
    
(3) LT 
    
(4) LT 
    
(5) LT 
    
(6) LT 
    
(7) LT 
    
(8) LT 
    
LT_1 0.88** 
(63.3) 
0.89** 
(65.7) 
1.14** 
(29.5) 
1.15** 
(29.8) 
0.88** 
(64.9) 
0.89** 
(66.8) 
1.14** 
(29.6) 
1.15** 
(29.9) 
LT_2   -0.27** 
(7.29) 
-0.27** 
(7.31) 
  -0.27** 
(7.28) 
-0.27** 
(7.31) 
LGINI 0.01 
(0.50) 
0.01 
(0.33) 
-0.003 
(-0.19) 
-0.005 
(-0.29) 
0.008 
(0.51) 
0.005 
(0.35) 
-0.003 
(-0.19) 
-0.005 
(-0.29) 
LGHET -0.27 
(-0.26) 
0.21 
(0.21) 
-0.59 
(-0.51) 
-0.11 
(-0.10) 
    
LTRUS -0.02 
(-1.42) 
-0.02 
(-1.24) 
-0.03* 
(-1.81) 
-0.02 
(-1.60) 
-0.04 
(-1.17) 
-0.03 
(-1.04) 
-0.06 
(-1.64) 
-0.05 
(-1.46) 
LHC -0.21* 
(-1.93) 
-0.16 
(-1.50) 
-0.24* 
(-1.94) 
-0.18 
(-1.52) 
-0.19* 
(-1.94) 
-0.16* 
(-1.70) 
-0.20* 
(-1.86) 
-0.17 
(-1.60) 
LDAY -0.005 
(-0.63) 
-0.005 
(-0.64) 
-0.007 
(-0.71) 
-0.007 
(-0.72) 
-0.005 
(-0.61) 
-0.005 
(-0.63) 
-0.007 
(-0.69) 
-0.007 
(-0.72) 
LRAIN 0.001 
(0.58) 
0.002 
(0.85) 
0.001 
(0.54) 
0.002 
(0.77) 
0.001 
(0.58) 
0.002 
(0.86) 
0.001 
(0.53) 
0.002 
(0.76) 
LSNOW -0.003 
(-0.23) 
-0.004 
(-0.31) 
0.0003 
(0.21) 
0.0002 
(0.16) 
-0.004 
(-0.30) 
-0.004 
(-0.30) 
0.0002 
(0.13) 
0.0002 
(0.14) 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sargan-test (P-value) 
 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
Serial correlation 
 First order (P-value) 
 Second order (P-value) 
 
0.00 
0.01 
 
0.00 
0.01 
 
0.00 
0.00 
 
0.00 
0.00 
 
0.00 
0.01 
 
0.00 
0.01 
 
0.00 
0.00 
 
0.00 
0.00 
Sample 
Groups 
719 
46 
719 
46 
719 
46 
719 
46 
719 
46 
719 
46 
719 
46 
719 
46 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. * and ** indicate significance at 5 and 1 per cent levels, respectively (one-sided tests).  
In each of the estimates, year dummies are included but not reported to save space 
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Figure A1. Data Envelopment Analysis Method 
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Figure A2. Illustration of Tripartite Decomposition 
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